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International Regulation of Commercial
Whaling: The Consequences of Norway's
Decision to Hunt the Minke Whale
By MARTHA HowrON*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 1993, Norway announced to a shocked world
that it would resume the commercial whaling of Minke whales in the
North Atlantic.' Norway's announcement followed closely the May
1993 decision by the International Whaling Commission (IVC) to ex-
tend the moratorium against whaling, in effect since 1986, for at least
one more year 2 Norway justified its decision to hunt Minke whales
for commercial uses by citing a report of the IWC Scientific Commit-
tee which stated that stocks of Minke whales had recovered enough to
allow limited hunting? The report of the Scientific Committee, which
included a plan for limited harvesting of certain whale populations in
certain areas, had been rejected by the IWC at its meeting in May of
1993. 4 Norway then embarked on a self-regulated plan for whaling,
authorizing a catch of 296 Minke whales in the 1993 season, including
136 for scientific purposes.5
The reaction to Norway's announcement was tremendous. Fif-
teen nations signed a resolution condemning Norway's resumption of
whaling.6 Consumers in many countries began boycotting imports of
Norwegian fish and fish products.7 In the United States, the Corn-
* Member of the Class of 1995. B.A. Yale University, 1992. I would like to thank
Jennifer Swanson for her help in selecting this topic.
1. Oslo Resumes Whaling Despite IWC Ban, Nnmni WK..Y., June 14,1993, at 11.
2. Id.
3. Panel Ex-Chief Blasts IWC for Rejecting Management Plan, Japan Economic New-
swire, June 12, 1993, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Jen File.
4. Id.
5. Norway Ends 1993 Commercial Whale Hunt, Reuter European Business Report,
Sept. 15, 1993, available in LEXIS, Busfin Library, Reueub File.
6. President Clinton Delays Whaling Sanctions on Norway, BNA Ir'L TRADE REP.,
Oct. 6, 1993, at 1678.
7. Greg McIvor, Boycott of Norwegian Fish Products Starts in Australia, Agence
France Press, Aug. 16, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Afp File; Norway. Last-
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merce Department certified Norway under the Pelly Amendment to
the 1967 Fisherman's Protective Act,8 requiring the President to de-
cide within sixty days whether trade sanctions were appropriate
against the offending country for "diminishing the effectiveness" of
the IWC treaty.' However, despite the United States obligation to
help enforce the provisions of the International Whaling Commission,
President Clinton decided on October 4, 1993 to delay the imposition
of sanctions against Norway.1" This decision was no doubt influenced
by the deep political gratitude the American government felt for Nor-
way. Earlier in the year, Norway had helped to bring about a success-
ful conclusion to the Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations.11
It therefore appears that effective enforcement of the IWC mora-
torium is completely lacking. If Norway is allowed to continue its
whaling in violation of the moratorium, there is nothing to prevent
other whaling countries, such as Japan and Iceland, from resuming
commercial whaling as well. This Note will analyze the need for inter-
national cooperation in the regulation of whaling through a case study
of Norway's decision to resume commercial whaling. It will cover the
background of the controversy, including its history, and will evaluate
the current IWC moratorium. It will discuss Norway's rights under
international law and the rights of other nations to respond to Nor-
way's actions with sanctions or other punitive means. It will analyze
the role of the United States in enforcing the IWC treaty and explain
why reliance on the United States has proven ineffective. Finally, it
will explore alternatives for future enforcement of whaling regula-
tions. This Note will propose that the only viable option available to
prevent the resurgence of world-wide commercial whaling is for non-
governmental organizations, such as Greenpeace, to put economic
pressure on Norway and the other whaling countries.
Minute Attempts to Head off Whaling Trade Sanctions, Inter Press Service, Oct. 1, 1993,
available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Inpres File (Consumer boycotts in Germany and
Great Britain); Greenpeace Backs Supermarket Boycott of Norwegiani Seafood, Agenco
France Press, Nov. 25, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Afp File.
8. America Considering Import Ban in Norwegian Whaling Protest, Press Association
Newsffle, Aug. 7, 1993, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Panews File; Commerce Noti-
fies President that Norway's Resumption of Whaling Is Basis for Embargo, BNA INT'L
TRADE DAILY, Aug. 18, 1993, available in LEXIS, BNA Library, Bnaitd File.
9. 22 U.S.C. § 1978 (1988).
10. Andrea Shalal-Esa, Clinton Delays Sanctions Against Norway on Whaling, Reuters
World Service, Oct. 4, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, Reuwld File.
11. Greg McIvor, Norway Officials Dismiss Reports It May Halt Whaling, Reuter Eu-
ropean Business Report, Oct. 1, 1993, available in LEXIS, Busfin Library, Reueub File;
Norway: Last-Minute Attempts to Head off Whaling Trade Sanctions, "upra note 7.
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H. BACKGROUND
A. The Origins of the IWC Moratorium
The International Whaling Commission was created in 1946 by
Article III of the International Convention for the Regulation of
Whaling (ICRW). 12 One of the stated goals of the IWC was to "estab-
lish a system of international regulation for the whale fisheries to en-
sure proper and effective conservation and development of whale
stocks."13 The IWC regulates hunting seasons, capture methods, and
catch quotas for each species of great whale through schedules that
are reviewed annually.14 Amendments to the schedule quotas require
a three-fourths majority vote.'5 The rapidly diminishing whale stocks
made it necessary to create a system of regulation because the whaling
industry was in danger of putting itself out of business through over-
hunting.16 During the first three decades of the IVWC's existence,
whale populations continued to decrease to even more dangerous
levels. 17 The United States Marine Mammal Protection Act, passed in
1972, imposed a moratorium on the importation of whale products,
including oil, baleen, and whale bone.13 This moratorium helped to
limit the objective of whale hunting to the acquisition of whale meat,
but it did not end the hunting of whales.1 9 Finally, in 1982, due partly
to the addition of new member nations, the anti-whaling countries in
the IWC were able to gather the three-fourths majority necessary to
12. Pat W. Birnie, International Legal Issues in the Management and Protection of the
Whale: a Review of Four Decades of Experience, 29 NAT. RE-sOURCESJ. 903, 908 (19S9);
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, art. III, 62 Stat.
1716, 161 U.N.T.S. 361 [hereinafter ICRW].
13. ICRW, supra note 12, pmbl.
14. Benjamin van Drimmelen, Comment, The International Mismanasement of Wal-
ing, 10 UCLA PAa BAsIN LJ. 240, 243 (1991).
15. ICRW, supra note 12, art. M, § 2. Amendments are restricted to those "necessary
to carry out the objectives and purposes of this Convention... [and that are] based on
scientific findings." Id., art. V, § 2.
16. Anthony D'Amato & Sudhir K. Chopra, Whales: Their Emerging Right to Life, 85
AM. J. INT'L L. 21, 29 (1991).
17. See Cynthia Taliaferro Bright, Note, The Future of the International Whaling Com-
mission: Can We Save the Whales?, 5 Gno. INrf Emrm. L. RFv. 815, S15-16 (1993).
18. Pub. L. No. 92-522,86 Stat. 1027 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407
(19ss)).
19. Dean M. Wilkinson, The Use of Domestic Measures to Enforce International Whal-
ing Agreements: A Critical Perspective, 17 Dmv. J. INT'L L. & PotA' 271, 280 (199).
20. D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 16, at 44.
19941
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pass an amendment declaring a moratorium on commercial whaling
that would go into effect in 1986.21
B. Weaknesses of the Moratorium
There are four principal reasons why the moratorium has not
been as effective as anti-whaling groups had hoped. First, the IWC
does not have its own enforcement provisions. It depends on individ-
ual nations to police themselves and others. 2 Therefor,, if the United
States fails to enforce the IWC moratorium for political reasons, as is
the case with Norway, there is little recourse.23 In addition, the IWC
only covers member countries, so nations can finance "pirate whalers"
from non-IWC nations to whale for them in order to avoid
restrictions? 4
Second, Article V of the ICRW, which governs amendments to
the IWC Schedule, provides that any government which files a timely
objection to any amendment is exempted from the requirements of
that amendment?" Objecting is an absolute right of all members, and
the objection clause of the ICRW may only be changed by unanimous
vote.26 Norway, Japan, Peru, and the USSR all filed timely objections
to the 1982 moratorium and therefore are not legally required to
abide by that agreement. 27 The objection provision has the potential
to severely limit the effectiveness of the quota system as well as the
current moratorium.28
Third, a major hole in the IWC moratorium is the exception in
Article VIII which allows whaling for the purpose of scientific re-
search. Article VIII (1) states:
Notwithstanding anything contained in this Convention, any Con-
tracting Government may grant to any of its nationals a special per-
mit authorizing that national to kill, take, and treat whales for the
21. Valeria Neale Spencer, Comment, Domestic Enforcement of International Law:
The International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, 2 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. &
PoL'Y 109, 113 (1991).
22. ICRW, supra note 12, art. IV.
23. See Bright, supra note 17, at 822.
24. van Drimmelen, supra note 14, at 250.
25. ICRW, supra note 12, art. V.
26. Id.
27. van Drimmelen, supra note 14, at 250.
28. Objection clauses are typical in international environmental treaties to encourage
participation by nations who would not be willing to join without the option to withdraw
from unacceptable decisions. It may be argued that although the objection clause Is a
weakness of the Convention, it does guarantee greater participation by the international
community.
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purposes of scientific research subject to such restrictions as to
number and subject to such other conditions as the Contracting
Government thinks fit.29
By calling their hunting of whales "scientific research," whaling na-
tions have managed to continue whaling activities during the morato-
rium, selling whale meat and other products in their domestic
markets?' Japan, for example, offered dubious scientific reasons for
its proposal to take over 800 Minke whales each year for ten years.31
As a result of pressure from the United States and the ,VC, Japan
actually reduced its take to 228 whales in 1991 and 330 whales in the
1992-93 season 32 The fact that whale carcasses sell for high prices on
the Japanese market after the "research" is completed,3 3 and the fact
that the old Japanese whaling vessels are now used as "research"
ships, both suggest that "scientific research" is a convenient way to
avoid the regulations of the IWC.34 Norway has also hunted hundreds
of whales in the North Atlantic under the guise of "scientific research"
since the moratorium was adopted.s
Finally, the IWC is required to base its decisions on accurate sci-
entific data, but obtaining such data about whale populations is ex-
tremely difficult because a whale's sex and age is sometimes
impossible to determine even after the whale has been killed 6 Age is
especially difficult to determine because all the great whales, except
for the sperm whale, lack teeth, ruling out the common aging method
of analyzing growth rings on teeth. 7 Therefore, scientists are often
unable to calculate whale populations even when using the sex and
age ratios of caught whales3 s Norway's reliance on the report of the
IWC Scientific Committee 9 to support its decision to resume whaling
is therefore not necessarily as logical as it might seem.
29. ICRW, supra note 12, art. VIIL
30. Bright, supra note 17, at 824.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 827-28.
33. Id. at 827.
34. Id. at 824.
35. Id. at 825.
36. van Drimmelen, supra note 14, at 247.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Panel Ex-Chief Blasts I"WC for Rejecting Management Plan, supra note 3.
1994]
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C. The Debate over the Purpose of the IWC
During the decade before the adoption of the IWC moratorium,
whaling and non-whaling nations became polarized over issues re-
garding the real purpose of the IWC.40 This polarization continues
today. Apart from a drive to maintain sufficient whale stocks for
whaling purposes, findings that whales may be of comparable intelli-
gence to humans has prompted some environmentalists to propose
that whales are entitled to a right to life.41 They argue that rather
than being viewed as animals available to serve the needs of humans,
"whales are entitled to consideration as moral entities,"42 Indications
that whales suffer unconscionable amounts of pain when harpooned
has strengthened conservationist arguments that whales should be
protected.43 According to this view, the IWC should work towards
permanently outlawing all types of whaling. The recent establishment
of a permanent Antarctic Ocean sanctuary for whales at the May 1994
meeting of the IWC 4 demonstrates the influence of the environ-
mentalist perspective on the IWC's actions.45
However, whaling countries such as Iceland, Japan, and Norway
reject environmentalists' emotional attachment to whales and view
the marine mammals in the "same moral category as the cow" despite
the indications of much higher intelligence.46 Recently, the whaling
countries began to protest the continued moratorium on whaling,
complaining that the IWC had been intended to oversee the manage-
ment of whaling but has since become a puppet of the moral crusade
against whaling.47 As one government official in Icefand remarked,
"No Icelander is against whaling as such. We don't have an emotional
relationship with whales-leave that to the Americans., 48 Whaling
nations believe that whales should be managed in the same way as
other marine resources, which would include hunting at a sustainable
40. D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 16, at 39.
41. Id. at 49.
42. Id. at 61.
43. Id. at 24-25.
44. Vote in Favour of a Sanctuary for Whales, EUR. ENV'T, May 31, 1994, available in
LEXIS, Envirn Library, Eurenv File.
45. See Christine Tierney, Whale Sanctuary Highlights Shift in j WC Role, Reuters
World Service, May 28, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, Reuwld File.
46. Benjamin Mee, Halt the Brain Drain: Help the Whale, INDEPENDENT, Aug. 23,
1993, at 15.
47. Lars Foyen, Unsentimental Icelanders Determined to Resume Whale Hunting, Reu-
ter European Business Report, Oct. 13, 1993, available in LEXIS, Buslin Library, Reueub
File.
48. Id.
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level.49 When the IWC refused to implement the proposals of the Sci-
entific Committee for resuming limited whaling of certain species,
whaling nations took it as a sign that "the IWC had become a whale
protection organization rather than a body whose mission is to man-
age whaling operations."'50 As a result of the dissatisfaction of whal-
ing countries regarding the decisions of the IWC, Iceland, Norway,
and other nations have found enough support to form a rival whaling
organization, called the North Atlantic Marine Mammal Committee
(NAMMCO). 51 As yet, NAMMCO only regulates small whales not
covered by the IWC, but it could expand its authority if dissatisfaction
with the IWC increases.5 2
In an effort to show disgruntled pro-whaling nations that it had
not abandoned its original purpose-the management of the whaling
industry-the 1WC approved a Revised Management Procedure
(RMP) at the same time it established the Antarctic sanctuary- 3 The
RMP includes a formula to calculate kill quotas should the morato-
rium be lifted.54
The strong feelings on both sides of the whaling controversy have
created insurmountable obstacles which prevent the effective preser-
vation of whale populations. Without consensus on the true goal of
the IWC, there will always be disagreement over its decisions. Nor-
way's deliberate flouting of the moratorium is an expression of the
frustration that whaling nations have felt towards the IWC's regula-
tions. It is an indication that something must be done to preserve in-
ternational cooperation on this sensitive issue before more whaling
countries follow Norway's lead.
49. Id.
50. Whaling: IWC Committee Chairman's Resignation a Shout of Protest, EuR. E.N'vT,
July 6, 1993, available in LEXIS, Envirn Library, Eurenv File.
51. Iceland to Follow Norway in Resuming Whaling Next Year, Japan Economic New-
swire, July 2, 1993, available in LEXS, Asiapc Library, Jen File.
52. Bright, supra note 17, at 819.
53. The Antarctic Sanctuary, established in May 1994, creates a sanctuary for whales
in which all whaling is prohibited. Both endangered and robust species are protected. The
sanctuary was approved overwhelmingly by the IWC with a vote of twenty-three to one.
Only Japan voted against it. Tierney, supra note 45.
54. Christine Tierney, IWC Approves Whale Management Resolution, Reuters World
Service, May 27, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, Reuwld File.
1994]
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IH. NORWAY'S LEGAL RIGHTS
A. Norway's Arguments
Because it is not bound by the IWC moratorium, Norway's re-
sumption of commercial whaling is not a violation of international
law.5 Under Article V of the Convention, Norway is not held to the
terms of any amendment to the IWC schedule if it files a timely objec-
tion.56 Norway filed such an objection in the case of the morato-
rium.57 Therefore, Norway's decision to whale is only a violation of
the spirit rather than the letter of the IWC moratorium. In August of
1993, Norway's foreign minister insisted that Norway's whaling policy
is "in line with international law and principles for a good policy on
the environment. '58
However, the debate is not over Norway's technical right to ig-
nore the moratorium, which is admitted by all nations involved, but
instead concerns the legality of the sanctions that other nations have
imposed on Norway in response to Norway's resumption of commer-
cial whaling.59 One commentator argues that "it is not whaling coun-
tries ... that are flouting the rules, but rather countries, including the
U.S., whose opposition to commercial and research whaling under-
mines the spirit and letter of the 1946 [Convention]." Although the
United States laws, such as the Pelly and Packwood Amendments
which will be discussed in Part IV, provide for sanctions to be imposed
against a country whose actions "diminish the effectiveness" 61 of the
Convention, "[iut is not altogether clear whether it is lawful to impose
... sanctions when a member merely exercises its unconditional right
to be exempted from IWC schedule amendments by opting out."62
The uncertainty is based on the underlying disagreement among mem-
ber nations over the true purpose of the IWC: is it to protect whales
or is it to provide for the survival of the whaling industry? 63
55. Susan Sabella, Total Ban on Whaling, USA TODAY, Jan. 27, 1994, at 6C.
56. ICRW, supra note 12, art. V.
57. van Drimmelen, supra note 14, at 250.
58. Stella Bugge, Norway Will Not Give in on Whaling, Slams U.S. Move, Reuters
World Service, Aug. 11, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, Reuwld File.
59. See Milton M.R. Freeman, Whale Hunts: Science, Not Sentiment, Should Be Guide,
Ol-rowA CrIzN, Aug. 4, 1993, at A9.
60. IL
61. The Pelly Amendment, 22 U.S.C. § 1978 (1988); the Packwood-Magnuson Amend-
ment of 1979, 16 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(2) (1988).
62. Spencer, supra note 21, at 119.
63. See supra Part II.C.
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Norway argues that Minke whales are a renewable resource and
that it is within its legal rights to manage the marine resources sur-
rounding the nation in a responsible manner.P Norway also claims
that whaling is a cultural tradition which coastal fishing families have
engaged in for centuries.65 Advocates of Norway's resumption of
commercial whaling point to the United States protection of hunting
by Alaskan natives of the endangered Bowhead whale as hypocriti-
cal.66 Norway bases its claim that Minke whale stocks have become a
renewable resource on the IWC Scientific Committee's finding that
there are approximately 86,700 Minke whales in the North Atlantic
and around 900,000 globally.67 Norwegians have interpreted this re-
port as implicitly recommending that the "protected" status of Minke
whales be revised in light of the new findings. 6s
B. The Weaknesses of Norway's Arguments
In fact, the IWC report did not conclude that a change was neces-
sary in the "protected" status of Minke whales.69 Despite the in-
creased numbers of Minke whales claimed by the report,7 0 the
unreliable nature of whale-population estimates makes it impossible
to verify Norway's assertion to any degree of certainty.71 It is appar-
ent that the number of Minke whales has increased, but the popula-
tion is more depleted in the North Atlantic, where Norway is
currently whaling, than in the Antarctic.v
Norway's argument that other nations have no legal right to im-
pose sanctions on it for its commercial whaling activities is without
merit. The IWC represents the international consensus, and Norway
remains a member of the organization. 3 Norway may well be im-
64. Per Kristian Pedersen, Norway Embraces Resource Protection, USA TODAY, Jan.
27, 1994, at 6C.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Sabella, supra note 55, at 6C.
70. Panel Ex-Chief Blasts 1WC for Rejecting Management Plan, supra note 3.
71. Other estimates of Minke whale populations differ greatly from the rejected report
of the IWC Scientific Committee. For example, a source at the European Environmental
Bureau stated that the Minke whale population had decreased by almost three-quarters
since 1940, making even limited hunting indefensible. Tony Samstag, Brundtland Honour
Is Withdrawn, Tmms (London), July 20, 1993, available in LEIS, World Library, Ttimes
File.
72. Bright, supra note 17, at 845.
73. Sabella, supra note 55, at 6C.
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mune from direct enforcement by the IWC because it properly filed
an objection, but a country that has agreed to enforce the IWC's regu-
lations should have the right to impose sanctions against any nation
that engages in actions which violate the moral and political policies of
the IWC.74 For example, in 1984 the United States pressured Japan to
withdraw its objection to the commercial whaling moratorium.75
Although there was no actual certification by the Secretary of Com-
merce under the Pelly Amendment because Japan chose to withdraw
its objection rather than risk sanctions,76 this case demonstrates that
the United States was willing to threaten sanctions even when the of-
fending nation was within its legal rights. Whether th- imposition of
sanctions against Japan would have been legal was not tested. Japan
viewed the agreement with the United States as a diplomatic move
rather than a legal necessity.77
Unilateral enforcement of the spirit of the IWC is the primary
way the IWC maintains any international credibility, as its capability
to exercise authority on its own is minimal at best.78 Because of the
many weaknesses in its structure, the IWC must rely on individual
nations, the United States in particular, to give teeth to its rules.
However, the United States has its own political agenda and may not
always place support of the IWC as its top priority. When Norway is
within its legal rights to engage in whaling, it is difficult for the United
States to justify hostile action toward an otherwise friendly nation.
IV. THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES
A. The Pelly Amendment
Since the mid-1960's the United States has pushed the IWC to-
wards a more conservationist stance.79 The IWC moratorium was pri-
marily a result of the United States pressure.s0 In 1971, well before
the IWC moratorium was passed, the United States Congress passed
the Petly Amendment to the 1967 Fisherman's Protective Act.81 The
74. Spencer, supra note 21, at 116.
75. Id. at 119.
76. Id.; see infra part IV.A. for a discussion of the Pelly Amendment.
77. Spencer, supra note 21, at 119.
78. Id. at 115.
79. Stephen M. Hankins, Comment, The United States Abuse of the Aboriginal Whal-
ing Exception: A Contradiction in United States Policy and a Dangerous Precedent for the
Whale, 24 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 489, 492 (1990).
80. Id. at 492, 501.
81. Pelly Amendment, Pub. L. No. 92-219, 85 Stat. 786 (1954) (codified at 22 U.S.C.
§ 1978 (1988)).
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amendment was a response to a fisheries conflict with Denmark,82 but
the legislators also intended to authorize trade sanctions against any
country that violated provisions of the International Whaling
Commission.83
The Pelly Amendment provides that a nation which engages in
activities that "diminish the effectiveness of an international fishery
conservation program" will be certified by the Secretary of Com-
merce s4 Following receipt of the certification, the President has sixty
days to decide whether fishing products from the country in question
should be excluded from the United States.85 This decision is entirely
discretionary, 6 but the President must notify Congress if an option
other than a total embargo on the fishing exports of the violating na-
tion is chosen?
The Pelly Amendment has been used several times by the United
States to support decisions of the IWC.s For example, in November
1974 Japan and the Soviet Union were certified for exceeding IWC
quotas for Minke whales.89 Both countries agreed to respect quotas in
the future, but the Soviet Union was again certified in April 1985 for
exceeding Minke whale quotas.90 Norway was certified in 1986 for
hunting Minke whales in violation of the moratorium, 91 In response
to the Pelly certification, Norway promised to cease commercial whal-
ing at the end of 1987. However, in the same statement, Norway
announced plans to continue whaling for scientific reasons. 93
Because the President has discretion to refuse to impose any
sanctions under the Pelly Amendment, its effect has been largely dis-
appointing. In the years since its implementation, no sanctions have
actually been imposed.9 However, as the above examples demon-
strate, often the threat of sanctions can be enough to convince the
offending nation to reconsider its actions.95 For example, in 1984 Ja-
82. Wlkinson, supra note 19, at 280.
83. Bright, supra note 17, at 830.
84. 22 U.S.C. § 1978(a)(1) (1988).
85. Id. § 1978(b).
86. Id.
87. Wilkinson, supra note 19, at 280.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 281.
90. Id.
91. Id
92. Id
93. Id. at 282.
94. Spencer, supra note 21, at 117.
95. Wildkinson, supra note 19, at 281.
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pan opted out of the moratorium and continued commercial whaling
but later agreed to withdraw its objection and halt commercial whal-
ing rather than risk being certified by the United States.9 6 In contrast,
the current crisis over Norway's resumption of whaling: may indicate a
new attitude on the part of whaling nations, who may no longer re-
spond to the mere threat of sanctions.
B. The Packwood-Magnuson Amendment
In 1979, when it became apparent that presidential discretion in
implementing the Pelly Amendment limited its effectiveness, Con-
gress passed the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment to the 1976 Fish-
ery Conservation Act.97 The Packwood Amendment provides for an
automatic reduction in the violator's allocation of fish in the United
States economic zone,98 which extends 200 miles from the shore.99
Unlike the Pelly Amendment, the Packwood Amendment does not
grant the President any discretion in imposing sanctions. Once a
country is certified, the sanctions go into effect automatically.10° The
fishing privileges of the offending nation in United States waters must
be reduced by no less than fifty percent once a nation is certified. 101
Also, a certification under the Packwood Amendment is, by defini-
tion, a certification under the Pelly Amendment.10 Packwood certifi-
cations have occurred twice since the amendment's inception.10 3
In some cases a reduction in fish allocations can be absolutely
meaningless, as was the case when President Reagan reduced Japan's
fishing allocation by one hundred percent in response to Japan's over-
reaching scientific whaling proposal in 1988.104 Japan's fishing alloca-
tion had already been set at zero to avoid overfishing, and so the
sanctions had no deterrent effect whatsoever.105
Congress's attempt to force the President to impose sanctions on
countries that violate the IWC rules indicates the seriousness with
96. Spencer, supra note 21, at 119.
97. Packwood-Magnuson Amendment of 1979, 16 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(2) (1988).
98. Id. § 182(e)(2)(B).
99. Bright, supra note 17, at 831 n.113.
100. Gene S. Martin, Enforcing the International Convention for the Regulation of
Whaling: The Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments, 17 DENV. J. INT'L L. & PoL'y
293, 294 (1989).
101. Id. at 297.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 298.
104. Id. at 305-06.
105. Id.
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which Americans view their role as the leaders of the whale conserva-
tion movement. However, despite this determination to support the
IWC, other American political interests have superseded the protec-
tion of whales, as the case of Japan Whaling Association
demonstrates.106
C. Japan Whaling Association
The Packwood Amendment was intended to limit the President's
discretion and thus shield the whaling issue from political pressure.107
However, in 1986 the Supreme Court drastically limited the impact of
the Packwood Amendment in Japan Whaling Association v. American
Cetacean Society.10 That case gave the Secretary of Commerce
greater discretion in the initial certification decision by denying that
the Packwood Amendment required the certification of every nation
exceeding IWC quotas.'"
In Japan Whaling Association, the American Cetacean Society
filed suit seeking a writ of mandamus to force the Secretary of Com-
merce to certify Japan for IWC quota violations.110 Instead of using
the certification process, the United States had entered into negotia-
tions with Japan which resulted in a promise by Japan to end commer-
cial whaling by 1988.111 The Supreme Court found that the
Amendment was not intended to strip the Secretary of Commerce of
all discretion in deciding which activities diminish the effectiveness of
a treaty."' The Court upheld the Secretary's refusal to certify Japan
and consequently weakened the effectiveness of the Packwood
Amendment." 3
Therefore, as the situation now stands, both the Secretary of
Commerce-in deciding whether or not to certify a country-and the
President-in choosing what sanctions, if any, to apply-are subject to
political pressures." 4 In his dissent in Japan Whaling Association, Jus-
tice Marshall pointed out with frustration that "the Court's decision
today leaves Congress no closer to achieving that goal [of deterring
106. Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soe'y, 478 U.S. 221 (1986).
107. Bright, supra note 17, at 831.
108. Japan Whaling Ass'n, 478 U.S. at 221.
109. Melinda K. Blatt, Note, Woe for the Whales: Japan Whaling Association v. Ameri-
can Cetacean Society, 55 U. CIN. L. RFv. 1285, 1293 (1987).
110. Japan Whaling Ass'n, 478 U.S. at 228.
111. Id. at 227-28.
112. Id. at 239.
113. Id at 241; Bright, supra note 17, at 832.
114. See Bright, supra note 17, at 832-35.
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the killing of whales] than it was in 1971, before either amendment
was passed." ' s
D. The United States Response to Norway
Japan Whaling Association set the stage for the current difficul-
ties that the IWC is having in enforcing its regulations. 116 Despite
overwhelming congressional support of sanctions against Norway for
its resumption of commercial whaling,117 President C:linton declined
to impose them.118 The Supreme Court's decision in Japan Whaling
Association allowed the President to decide, in October 1993, that it
would be more politically expedient simply to threaten sanctions
against Norway rather than embarrass that nation after it played a key
role in brokering the recent Middle East peace agreement. 119 White
House spokeswoman Maria Romash said Norway's longstanding
NATO participation and its help on other environmental issues also
factored into Clinton's decision not to impose sanctions at that
time.120 In addition to recognizing Norway's status as a staunch long-
time ally, Clinton was under pressure from supporters of the North
American Free Trade Agreement who were concerned about the pos-
sible repercussions of using economic sanctions for environmental
controversies.121 Clinton directed that a list of potential sanctions be
prepared, but he decided to wait to impose them until "all good faith
efforts to persuade Norway to follow agreed conservalion measures"
had failed.'2l As of May 1994, the Clinton Administration was still
"working through this with Norway"'" and sanctions were still an
empty threat. Clinton hoped that Norway would decide on its own to
follow the whaling guidelines, 24 but that does not seem likely to
occur.
1 2 5
In fact, it seems more likely that Norway will continue and even
expand its commercial whaling 26 and that other countries may soon
115. Japan Whaling Ass'n, 478 U.S. at 249 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
116. See Bright, supra note 17, at 832-35.
117. McIvor, supra note 11.
118. President Clinton Delays Whaling Sanctions on Norway, supra note 6, at 1678.
119. Shalal-Esa, supra note 10.
120. Id.
121. President Clinton Delays Whaling Sanctions on Norway, supra note 6, at 1678.
122. Id.
123. Clinton Still Weighing Sanctions over Whaling Dispute with Norway, BNA INT'L
ENV'T DAILY, May 20, 1994, available in LEXIS, Envirn Library, Bnaied File.
124. President Clinton Delays Whaling Sanctions on Norway, supra note 6, at 1678.
125. Bugge, supra note 58.
126. Id.
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follow suit.'2 7 Norwegian foreign minister Johan Joergen Hoist was
quoted as saying "[w]e intend to stand firm when it comes to Minke
whaling."' 2 In the current situation with Norway, it is becoming ap-
parent that the threat of sanctions will not have sufficient impact to
dissuade the Norwegians from whaling, possibly because the United
States has never followed through with sanctions in the past.12 9
The crisis with Norway could easily determine the future effec-
tiveness of the IWC, and thus President Clinton's refusal to impose
sanctions is of crucial importance to the entire international commu-
nity.130 Norway's return to commercial whaling and President Clin-
ton's failure to impose sanctions under either the Pelly or Packwood
Amendments leave the IWC without any way of asserting its author-
ity. Without the United States as its champion, the IWC is powerless
to prevent a resurgence of commercial whaling that could, quite possi-
bly, lead to the extinction of the great whales.' 3 '
It is easy to call for automatic sanctions that "should be imposed
for violations and lifted only upon actual compliance,"'"a but this ar-
gument ignores the political realities that the President must face
when deciding whether to sanction another country, especially one
that is a valuable ally such as Norway. Because of the many political
concerns, it may be wiser to look for other ways to enforce the IWC
rules, rather than relying entirely on the United States to be the po-
liceman of the IWC.
V. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE WHALING
DILEMMA
A. Suggested Solutions
With the IWC powerless and the United States politically and, in
Norway's view, legally 3 handcuffed, we must look for other ways to
regulate whaling. There are several options, each with its own
drawbacks.
First, some have suggested that another international treaty, such
as The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of
127. Foyen, supra note 47.
128. Bugge, supra note 58.
129. Andrea Shalal-Esa, Norway's PM Tries to Avert US Whaling Sanctions, Reuters
World Service, Sept. 29, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, Reuwld File.
130. Shalal-Esa, supra note 10.
131. Hankins, supra note 79, at 498.
132. Spencer, supra note 21, at 125.
133. See supra part HIL
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Wildlife Fauna and Flora (CITES), that has proved more effective
than the IWC, could be used to increase the protection of whales. 134
CITES has been effective in preventing the trade of whale meat by
pirate whalers who are not members of the IWC.-' The goal of
CITES is to protect ecosystems and habitats rather than simply to pro-
tect endangered animals from hunting.1 36 When CITES has been
most effective, for example in banning the trade of ivory from ele-
phant tusks, there has been an international consensus and full coop-
eration from all countries involved.137 The reason for this success may
be that the goals of CITES focus on protecting species, while the
IWC's stated goal is the development of the whaling industry.138 Ja-
pan, for example, used to import a great deal of ivory, but in recent
years has cooperated with the CITES ban.139
In the case of whaling, however, the international arena is po-
larized into whaling and anti-whaling camps. 40 Since the IWC is not
succeeding, it is doubtful that trying to use CITES to protect whale
habitats would succeed either, absent the essential element of full in-
ternational cooperation.14" '
Second, the IWC could be modified to remove its crippling weak-
nesses.1 42 The scientific research exception, which is responsible for
the slaughter of hundreds of whales every year, and the objection pro-
vision, which makes it legal for Norway to hunt whales commer-
cially, 43 would have to be removed for the IWC to be a
comprehensive and effective organization for the protection of
whales. However, removing either of these provisions would be op-
posed by the whaling countries and could lead to those countries with-
drawing from the IWC, which would defeat the purpose of any
modifications. 14 Another possibility is to discard the IWC as it exists
now and to replace it with a different structure to oversee and regulate
the whaling countries. Because the goal of the IWC is officially to
maintain and regulate the whaling industry, not to save the whales, the
134. Bright, supra note 17, at 838-46.
135. Id. at 841.
136. Id.
137. ld. at 841-42.
138. Id at 841.
139. Id at 842.
140. Id.
141. IdM at 842-44.
142. Id. at 846-47.
143. Spencer, supra note 21, at 113.
144. Bright, supra note 17, at 846.
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whaling countries understandably reject the idea of an indefinite mor-
atorium.145 However, creating another organization whose purpose it
was to save the whales would have the same problem of alienating the
whaling countries as would modifying the purpose of the existing
IWC. The new organization would undoubtedly not include the whal-
ing nations, and therefore would have little control over them.
Third, Congress could pass additional legislation to overturn the
holding in Japan Whaling Association, in the same way it passed the
Packwood Amendment in an attempt to remedy the weaknesses of
the Pelly Amendment. Popular opinion in the United States is in
favor of sanctions against nations that engage in whaling,146 but the
fate of Pely and Packwood when confronted with international polit-
ical realities suggests that Congress may be unable to force the execu-
tive branch to take action when it is not otherwise politically wise for
the United States. Whaling is simply not considered enough of an of-
fense to warrant a punishment as severe as the sanctions these amend-
ments prescribe. Unfortunately, it appears that whaling countries
have come to realize this and no longer consider the possibility of
sanctions from the United States or other countries as a real threat.147
B. Consumer Boycotts
The option most likely to succeed in protecting the whales is ac-
tion by independent international groups such as Greenpeace. In
1993, Greenpeace sponsored consumer boycotts against Norway that
resulted in a tremendous loss in profits for the Norwegian fishing in-
dustry."4 International firms such as Burger King have cancelled con-
tracts with Norway worth millions of dollars.1 49  One British
supermarket chain alone cancelled 4.5 million dollars worth of fish-
products orders to protest Norway's resumption of commercial whal-
ing.'50 In August of 1993, a boycott was launched in Australia where
at least 408 million dollars worth of Norwegian fish products are im-
ported annually.'-' Greenpeace claims that boycotts in Germany, the
United States, and Great Britain have cost Norway some 60 million
145. I& at 848.
146. See Freeman, supra note 59, at A9.
147. Shalal-Esa, supra note 10.
148. Norway Welcomes U.S. Whaling Decision, Reuter European Business Report, Oct.
4, 1993, available in LEXIS, Busfin Library, Reueub File.
149. Joshua Wime, Big Fish Running out of Patience with Nonvay's Refusal to Toe Whal-
ing Line, GuARDLNI, May 28, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Guardn Fle.
150. Greenpeace Backs Supermarket Boycott of Norwegian Seafood, supra note 7.
151. Boycott of Norwegian Fish Products Starts in Australia, supra note 7.
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dollars,152 although Norway estimates it has lost only a fraction of that
amount.153 Because it is not restrained by political pressures, well-
organized private action can be a powerful weapon.'
However, the boycotts currently in progress have not stopped
Norway from whaling. According to Greenpeace estimates, Norway
has lost over 45 million dollars in export revenues because of a whal-
ing industry that is worth only about 4 million dollars.'5 5 The Norwe-
gian government has stated that despite the losses, Norway will
continue to whale as a matter of "principle.
15 6
Nonetheless, there must be some point at which Norway would
be losing so much income from protest boycotts that it simply would
not be able to afford to continue whaling. Norway's fish exports to
the United States are worth about 70 million dollars, and total exports
to the United States are valued at 1.58 billion dollars. 57 Even if sanc-
tions are not imposed, it is still possible for the same crippling eco-
nomic effect to be achieved through voluntary consumer boycotts of
Norwegian imports. It would require a great deal of organization and
publicity, but it appears to be the most effective way to enforce the
IWC whaling moratorium in the absence of concrete action by the
United States government.
VI. CONCLUSION
The international community, represented by the majority at the
International Whaling Commission, voted in May 1993 to extend the
moratorium on commercial whaling.'58 In May 1994, the IWC again
renewed the moratorium for at least another year.'5 9 Norway began
commercial whaling in 1993 despite the ban endorsed by the interna-
tional community. 60 If the international consensus is to mean any-
thing there must be the means to enforce it. Yet every enforcement
152. Whaling Cost Norway $60 Million in Lost Exports-Greenpeace, Reuter European
Business Report, Feb. 22, 1994, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Reueub File.
153. Wine, supra note 149; see Norway: Whaling Has Not Had Adverse Effect on Ex-
ports, DAGENS NAERINGSLIV, Mar. 9, 1994.
154. Spencer, supra note 21, at 122.
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1993, at 8.
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mechanism appears to have failed in this instance because Norway
successfully completed a second season of commercial whaling in Au-
gust of 1994.161 Norway's example has shown the other whaling na-
tions that there are no effective obstacles to prevent them from
resuming commercial whaling themselves.
The upcoming IWC meeting in May 1995 will determine whether
the moratorium will be extended another year or whether limited har-
vesting of Minke whales will be permitted.162 Legal, regulated com-
mercial whaling may be preferable to unlimited illegal whaling by all
whaling nations, but in light of the uncertain scientific evidence re-
garding whale populations, the moratorium should be renewed. If
whaling nations continue to engage in whaling in violation of the mor-
atorium, the best possible method of discouraging whaling, absent
sanctions by the United States, is a well-organized consumer boycott.
If no action is taken, we are likely to drive the whales to extinc-
tion. One commentator has pessimistically stated that effective pro-
tection of whales is impossible because "it may be that some harvest-
sensitive resources simply defy management under international
law."16 3 We must hope that this view is proven incorrect and that we
can find a way to save the whales before it is too late.
161. See Norway Ends 1993 Commercial Whale Hunt, supra note 5; see also Norway's
1994 Commercial Whale Hunt Ends, Reuter's World Service, Aug. 29, 1994, Available in
LEXIS, World Library, Reuwld File.
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